

How does ideology impact American states' trade with China?

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(Please note that this work is currently in development. The findings are preliminary, and the full article is expected to undergo further revisions.)

While ideology is regarded as an elusive concept that may hardly exert a direct influence on international trade, its impact can still be discerned on the economic policymaking of politicians. It is argued that politicians with left-leaning ideology tend to adopt a pro-labor protectionist policy in labor-intensive countries, but a more pro-trade policy in skilled labor predominated countries. On the other hand, nations with right governments tend to be more open than others, except those right-governed nations with less internationally contested domestic markets, which were less financially open (Quinn, 1997). Some may also take into consideration factor endowments, arguing that left-wing (pro-labor) governments will adopt more protectionist trade policies in capital-rich countries, but adopt more pro-trade policies in labor-rich economies than right-wing (pro-capital) ones (Dutt & Mitra, 2005, 2006).

Although the literature has produced a rich panoply of studies on the impact of ideology on trade policy, the majority of them is built upon nation-level analysis. There is a dearth of research on ideology and international trade at the sub-national level. This is regrettable because an in-depth exploration of this topic could bring about more insights into the importance of ideology in modern days against the backdrop of the increasing complexity of the microeconomic structure of a country and accelerating political polarization. More importantly, intense geopolitical conflicts, whether tangibly or intangible ones, are complicating economic relations between countries. The U.S. and China have provided a prominent example of how a bilateral economic relationship can be perplexed by ideology-led geopolitical rivalry over the past decade.

The United States is the country that has experienced a massive level of political polarization since the beginning of the 21st century. Although some may argue that geopolitical concerns are the main determinant of a nation's foreign policy, ideology does matter too, especially in today's American political climate (Jeong & Quirk, 2019). It is argued that traditionally, Democrats in general advocate more protectionist policies, especially in the early 2000s, than do Republicans as the Democratic party is labeled as the party of labor while the Republican party as the party of capital (Che et al., 2022; Keech & Pak, 1995; Milner & Judkins, 2004).

But does this pattern also apply to the U.S. trade policy towards China, the largest competitor of America nowadays? While the Republicans contributed greatly to China's accession to WTO (Karol, 2000; U.S. Congress, 2000), the last decade has seen the conservatives move to the right even further, with populist leaders such as Donald

Trump initiating a trade war with China in response to rising support for the restriction of the U.S.-China trade among the Republicans (Kafura & Smeltz, 2021). On the other hand, even though Democrats share Republicans' view that Beijing is an unfair trade partner and mostly a rival to Washington, they still favor more friendly engagement with China compared to Republicans (Smeltz et al., 2020). As intra-party polarization is playing an increasingly important role in the U.S. trade policy (Friedrichs, 2022; Friedrichs & Tama, 2022), it is crucial that we adopt a more nuanced approach to studying this topic. Hence, sub-national level analysis is necessitated. This article employs data on the trade between all 50 American states and China between 2009 and 2020. The findings suggest that in general, the more liberal a state becomes, the higher volumes of trade it has with China. Conversely, the more conservative a state turns, the less trade it will engage in with China.

Literature review and hypothesis

The overlap between ideological and partisan polarization has become a dominant phenomenon in contemporary American politics and has extended its influences to U.S. China policy (Friedrichs & Tama, 2022; Gries, 2014; Trubowitz & Harris, 2019; Trubowitz & Seo, 2012; Xie, 2010). Many times, debates over policies toward China have been carried out in a partisan manner. It is usually regarded that Republicans are more vocal and outspoken in their critic of China-related issues such as trade, human rights, military expansion and Taiwan (G. Kafura, 2022; Kuk et al., 2022; Smeltz, 2022; Smeltz & Fellow, 2020; Xie, 2010). From "Who lost China to Communism?" in the early 1950s to the U.S.-China trade war to Republican senators' push for a more combative stance on China, Republican politicians seem to have always been at the forefront of criticizing and politicizing China issues and more frequently proposing tougher policies, compared to their Democratic counterparts, toward China (Nye, 2020; Rubio, 2022; Trubowitz & Seo, 2012).

However, the "China Card" can also be played by Democrats to for partisan reasons (Bush, 1995: 149-150; Harding, 1992: 44; Sutter, 2017; Trubowitz & Seo, 2012). In the 1992 presidential campaign, the Democratic majority in Congress, exemplified by the presidential candidate Bill Clinton, launched harsh criticism of Republican president George H. W. Bush's moderate approach to China (Sutter, 2017; Trubowitz & Seo, 2012; Xie, 2010). The Democratic Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's latest trip to Taiwan in August 2022, despite constant warnings from China, is often viewed as a meaningful help to the Democrats in the midterm elections by competing with Republicans on tackling China threat (Razdan, 2022). The Biden Administration's implementation of Chips and Science Act of 2022 is another effort to counter China in the semiconductor industry (Shepardson & Mason, 2022).

It can be seen that studying ideology is not an easy task since it is part of psychology that cannot always be measured accurately. In the meantime, its impact on policy making can also be swayed by political calculations and external pressures. While it is possible to study a leader's ideology through in-depth case studies, it is practically


challenging to investigate the exact influence of a politician's ideology, especially the rank-and-file ones, on nation-level issues like international trade.

Nevertheless, at the sub-national level in the context of American politics, it is still feasible to deduce the political environment of a state (Berry et al., 1998; Mickey, 2022; Shor & McCarty, 2011) and thus predict the trajectory of policy making at the state level. A distinct advantage of studying ideology at the state level is to capture the nuanced variation of ideology. As argued by Shor and McCarty (2011), despite strong nationalizing trends in American politics, political parties below the national level are quite heterogeneous. Although no Republicans in Congress are more liberal than the most conservative Democrats, many states have Republican state legislative contingents that are more liberal than the Democratic caucuses of many states. In the meantime, although moderate partisans languish at the national level, they are thriving at the state level.

Meanwhile, the accelerating polarization over the past two decades has been adding more uncertainties to the role played by ideology. While the polarization of U.S. Congress has been characterized by an asymmetric pattern of GOP movement to the right at the national level (Hacker & Pierson, 2020; McCarty, 2012), the predominant asymmetry in the states is one characterized by Democratic movement to the left (Shor & McCarty, 2022). What could be missed at the aggregate level analysis may be found at the disaggregate level. Ideology is one such tricky topic.

Therefore, a more nuanced political environment can be presented at the state level. Figure 1 gives a bird's eye view of the average ideology scores of each state over the past decade. Unlike electoral maps where states are usually labeled as either red or blue, more nuances can be found if ideology scores, rather than electoral results, are used to as the measurement. As can be seen from Table 1, traditionally believed "red states" like Mississippi, Arizona, and Florida are not distinctly conservative in terms of average ideology scores of House representatives. On the other hand, some "blue states" like Minnesota and Virginia are not necessarily as liberal as people think. As argued by Shor and McCarty (2011), state legislative medians correlate highly with voter ideology measures. That is to say, in Figure 1, the states that do not position themselves along the ideological spectrum the way people commonly believe could reflect the real political environment.

Figure 1. Average ideology scores of each state, 2009-2020.



It used to be believed that the Republican Party was the party of free trade. Business conservatives have historically promoted a friendlier China policy conducive to increased trade, investment, and profits. For instance, the U.S.-China Business Council and AmCham China, which lobby on behalf of U.S. companies doing business with China, have worked closely with many Republicans on the Hill to support pro-China and block anti-China legislation (Gries, 2014: 209). Even during the lead-up to the 2000 presidential election where the partisan divide was intense, a good number of GOP House representatives helped the democratic president Bill Clinton pass the bill that allowed China’s accession to WTO (Karol, 2000; U.S. Congress, 2000).

Nevertheless, the last decade has seen conservative politicians such as Donald Trump initiate a trade war with China as rising support for the restriction of the U.S.-China trade among the Republicans (Kafura & Smeltz, 2021). The Republican Party as a whole has also been moving further away from free trade and closer towards protectionism to gain economic independence in the name of defending the U.S. national security (Levy, 2019). As a matter of fact, while Trump may have accelerated this change in 2016, the trend toward conservative and Republican opposition to globalization started well before Trump arrived on the political scene (Mutz, 2017). About 66% of Republicans believe that it is important to get tougher than build a strong relationship with China on economic issues, compared to a much smaller percentage within Democrats (33%) (Silver et al., 2020). Driven by ideology, the GOP is poised to

adopt more protectionist policies towards China.

On the other hand, traditional Democrats, especially those whose constituents are primarily comprised of blue-collar workers, tend to join Republicans to condemn unfair Chinese trade practices and favor a protectionist policy towards China (Che et al., 2022; Gries, 2014; Miller & Schofield, 2008). In addition, Democrats who are concerned about human rights issues, such as former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, often advocate for tougher China policy (Gries, 2014). Nonetheless, economic liberals among the Democrats have been more supportive of globalization than conservatives at least as far back as 2002 (Miller & Schofield, 2008; Mutz, 2017). Even though the majority of both liberals and conservatives perceive globalization as good for the country, this has increasingly become more of a liberal viewpoint than a conservative one (Mutz, 2017).

Moreover, some Democrats also argue a pro-China policy of engagement to better integrate China into the global economic, political, and security orders (Gries, 2014). Even though the majority of both liberals and conservatives perceive globalization as good for the country, this has increasingly become more of a liberal viewpoint than a conservative one. In addition, voters in areas more exposed to trade liberalization with China in the 21st century subsequently shift their support toward Democrats (Che et al., 2022), which also provides electoral incentives for Democratic representatives to pursue a pro-China trade policy.

Hence, the preceding discussion generates two key hypotheses of this study:

The more conservative a state's House representatives become, the less trade it will engage in with China; conversely, the more liberal the representatives, the more trade the state will engage in with China.

While the primary independent variable of this article is ideology, I also recognize that it cannot be the sole determinant of the U.S. state-level trade with China since there could be various factors involved. Therefore, this article seeks to identify the correlation rather than build causality between ideology and U.S.-China trade. However, by including interaction terms and conducting disaggregate analysis, this article does aim to provide explanations for how state-level trade with China demonstrates different patterns under different ideological settings. This article contributes to the scholarship by offering empirical analysis of state-level trade with China from an ideological perspective, which could be extended to further research on the role of ideology and polarization in the U.S. foreign policy making.

Research design

This study uses a panel dataset consisting of all 50 American states for which data is available. The time frame for most variables spans from 2009 to 2020. A more detailed empirical study of the relationship between state-level trade with China and ideology necessitates different measures of both trade and ideology. Hence, the dependent

variable, state-level trade with China, is measured on five dimensions: export, export (% of state GDP), import, import (% of state GDP), and total trade volume. The reason to measure the dependent variable is that different states may have different comparative advantages in terms of industry development, which leads to states' varying trade levels with China (The US-China Business Council, 2023).

The primary independent variable is measured by ideological positions of House representatives, The reason that this article focuses on the House rather than the Senate is that since the House follows proportional representation, House representatives' ideology can hence better reflect their constituents' ideological predisposition than that of senators.

This article uses two datasets to measure ideology positions. The first is the DW-NOMINATE (Dynamic Weighted Nominal Three-step Estimation) (Lewis et al., 2024). There are two dimensions of DW-NOMINATE: The first dimension is measured through most of American history has been "liberal" versus "conservative" (also referred to as "left" versus "right"). A second dimension picks up differences within the major political parties over slavery, currency, nativism, civil rights, and lifestyle issues during periods of American history. Considering that the first dimension refers to socio-economic matters and the second dimension to race relations, the data on the first dimension is employed here since the theme of the article is regard international trade.

The second dataset for ideological position is Ideal Points composed by Michael Bailey (2021). The reason to employ a second ideological dataset is to test whether the relationship between the trade and ideology (measured by DW-NOMINATE) still holds a different ideology measure is used. As argued by Bailey (2021), DW-NOMINATE scores are static as the measure is based upon the assumption of fixed preferences. For example, it certainly seems plausible that the Senator Hollings of 1970 would differ from the Senator Hollings of 2000. Hence, A more dynamically-measured data set would serve the purpose of robustness check for the model.

The use of control variables in this article is built upon a rich panoply of literature on international trade. The continuous control variables include trade union membership coverage (Karier, 1990), unemployment rate (Belenkiy & Riker, 2015; Mohler et al., 2018), population (Guerrico, 2023; Sasaki, 2017), and debt (Serfaty, 2022). In additional, a couple of dummy variables are also incorporated, including coastline of a state (Jetter et al., 2019; Lane & Pretes, 2020), party affiliation (Autor et al., 2016; Bacchus, 2020), and governors (Kincaid, 1984). Table 1 in the appendix demonstrates the variables used in this paper and sources of the data obtained.

Table 1. Variable description and sources of data

Variable	Definition	Data Source
Export	Net export to China	International Trade Administration

ExportGDP (% of GDP)	Export to China (% of state GDP)	International Trade Administration
Import	Net import from China	International Trade Administration
ImportGDP (% of GDP)	Import from China (% of state GDP)	International Trade Administration
Trade (% of GDP)	Trade volume with China (% of state GDP)	International Trade Administration
DWHouse (% of Gov. Exp.)	Ideology score of the House (% of government expenditure)	DW-NOMINATE Ideal points by Michael Bailey
Coast	States with a coastline (1=yes, 0=no)	World Population Review
Party	Dominance of legislatures at the state level (GOP = 1, Dems/tie = 0)	Compiled by the author
Governor	Partisan affiliation of governors (GOP = 1, Dems/independent = 0)	Compiled by the author
Member	Union membership coverage	Unionstats.com
L. Unemploy	Lagged unemployment rate	U.S. Bureau of Labor
Population	Population of each state	U.S. Census Bureau
DebtGDP	FDI net inflows (% of GDP) (% of GDP)	usgovernmentspending.com

This paper estimates panel regression models in order to explain American states' trade with China as a function of ideology of U.S. House representatives and a selection of control variables outlined in the previous section. A pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model is employed in this article. The basic regression frameworks built upon the literature review and theoretical framework is as follows:

$$\log Trade_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log DWHouse_{it} + \beta_2 Coast_{it} + \beta_3 Party_{it} + \beta_4 Governor_{it} + \beta_5 Member_{it} + \beta_6 \log L. Unemploy_{it} + \beta_7 \log Population_{it} + \beta_8 \log DebtGDP_{it} + \beta_9 DWHouse_{it} \times Coast_{it} +$$

$$\beta_{10}DWHouse_{it} \times Party_{it} + \beta_{11} DWHouse_{it} \times Governor_{it} + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable is $Trade_{it}$, which refers to the measure of states' trade with China, where $i = 1, 2, 3 \dots n$ indexes country; $t = 1, 2, 3 \dots n$ indexes year. It is measured by five metrics, $Export_{it}$ (net export), $ExportGDP_{it}$ (export as % of GDP), $Import_{it}$ (net import), $ImportGDP_{it}$ (import as % of GDP), $TradeGDP_{it}$ (trade as % of GDP). The primary independent variable, $DWHouse$, is measured by the mean ideology scores of all U.S. House representatives of a state. Both datasets for $DWHouse$ use an ideological spectrum to evaluate representatives' ideology scores, ranging between -1 and 1. The higher the score, the more conservative the representative is, and vice versa.

The model also includes several control variables that could influence the trade. First, there are three dummy variables included: 1) $Coast$ equals 1 if a state has a coastline and 0 otherwise; 2) $Party$ represents the dominant party at the state level, with 1 meaning the state is dominated by Republicans and 0 by Democrats or a tie; 3) $Governor$ equals 1 if the governor of the state is Republican and 0 Democrats of independents.

Additionally, the model utilizes a couple of continuous variables: 1) $Member$ measures the union membership coverage of a state; 2) $L. Unemploy$ represents the unemployment rate from the last year; 3) $Population$ means the population of each state; 4) $DebtGDP$ measures the debt level of each state as a percentage of state GDP. Moreover, three interaction terms are included: $DWHouse \times Coast$, $DWHouse \times Party$, and $DWHouse \times Governor$.

Empirical results and discussions

Table 2 (DW-NOMINATE for ideology) presents the results of relationship between ideology of House representatives and, with export and export (% of state GDP) as the dependent variables for models 1 and 2, import and import (% of state GDP) for models 3 and 4, and trade (% of GDP) for model 5. It can be seen that across all model specifications, House ideology, holding all other factors constant, consistently demonstrates a significant and negative relationship with all five dimensions of trade, indicating that the more conservative of a state's House representatives become, the less trade the state has with China, the vice versa. Table 3 (Ideal Points for ideology) yields similar results.

In the meantime, some control variables offer some insights on their impacts on the trade with China. Both tables show that if a state's legislature is dominated by Republicans, conservative ideology will have a stronger negative relationship with the state's imports from China. This is understandable as the GOP, especially since Trump came to office, has been moving further away from free trade and closer towards protectionism to gain economic independence in the name of defending the U.S. national security (Levy, 2019). However, exports are not impacted by the composition of state legislature. This is likely due to the fact that U.S. exports to China support a broad swath of the U.S. economy (The US-China Business Council, 2023), and House

representatives, no matter how conservative they are, need to make sure their constituents are not negatively impacted by any potential economic shocks from cutting exports to China. In addition, both tables illustrate that unemployment rate from the previous year and population have a positive correlation with exports to and imports from China. Those results are by and large intuitive as they can be explained by classic economic theories.

Table 2. Panel regression results (DW-NOMINATE)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Export (1)	ExportGDP (2)	Import (3)	ImportGDP (4)	TradeGDP (5)
DWHouse	-1.576*** (0.488)	-1.549*** (0.492)	-1.567*** (0.327)	-1.540*** (0.334)	-1.432*** (0.311)
Coast	-0.012 (0.095)	-0.130 (0.096)	-0.087 (0.064)	-0.205*** (0.065)	-0.151** (0.061)
Party	-0.070 (0.156)	-0.047 (0.157)	-0.463*** (0.105)	-0.440*** (0.107)	-0.294*** (0.099)
Governor	-0.138 (0.084)	-0.132 (0.085)	-0.012 (0.056)	-0.006 (0.058)	-0.039 (0.054)
Member	0.026*** (0.009)	0.008 (0.009)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)
L. unemploy	0.137*** (0.029)	0.187*** (0.029)	0.115*** (0.019)	0.166*** (0.020)	0.193*** (0.018)
Population	1.143*** (0.044)	0.124*** (0.044)	1.480*** (0.030)	0.461*** (0.030)	0.327*** (0.028)
DebtGDP	0.180* (0.094)	0.257*** (0.095)	-0.269*** (0.063)	-0.192*** (0.065)	-0.002 (0.060)
DWHouse x Coast	2.287*** (0.333)	2.357*** (0.336)	0.898*** (0.224)	0.968*** (0.228)	1.559*** (0.213)
DWHouse x Party	1.103* (0.655)	0.909 (0.661)	1.809*** (0.440)	1.615*** (0.449)	1.410*** (0.418)
DWHouse x Governor	0.749** (0.294)	0.767*** (0.297)	0.648*** (0.198)	0.666*** (0.202)	0.712*** (0.188)
Observations	596	596	596	596	596
R ²	0.700	0.221	0.885	0.519	0.480
Adjusted R ²	0.689	0.191	0.881	0.500	0.460
F Statistic (df = 11; 573)	121.654***	14.757***	400.779***	56.156***	48.160***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3. Panel regression results (Ideal Points)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Export (1)	ExportGDP (2)	Import (3)	ImportGDP (4)	TradeGDP (5)
DWHouse	-0.838*** (0.206)	-0.805*** (0.208)	-0.484*** (0.140)	-0.452*** (0.143)	-0.545*** (0.132)
Coast	0.215** (0.090)	0.098 (0.091)	0.055 (0.061)	-0.061 (0.062)	0.043 (0.057)
Party	0.015 (0.140)	0.021 (0.142)	-0.367*** (0.095)	-0.361*** (0.097)	-0.260*** (0.090)
Governor	-0.090 (0.081)	-0.084 (0.082)	0.046 (0.055)	0.052 (0.056)	0.014 (0.052)
Member	0.024*** (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.012* (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
L. unemploy	0.137*** (0.028)	0.188*** (0.029)	0.108*** (0.019)	0.160*** (0.020)	0.189*** (0.018)
Population	1.170*** (0.045)	0.152*** (0.046)	1.474*** (0.031)	0.456*** (0.032)	0.344*** (0.029)
DebtGDP	0.169* (0.092)	0.241** (0.093)	-0.242*** (0.063)	-0.170*** (0.064)	0.012 (0.059)
DWHouse x Coast	1.096*** (0.149)	1.089*** (0.150)	0.387*** (0.101)	0.381*** (0.103)	0.710*** (0.095)
DWHouse x Party	0.799*** (0.287)	0.732** (0.291)	0.520*** (0.195)	0.453** (0.200)	0.679*** (0.184)
DWHouse x Governor	0.271** (0.124)	0.250** (0.126)	0.310*** (0.085)	0.288*** (0.087)	0.276*** (0.080)
Observations	600	600	600	600	600
R ²	0.703	0.220	0.884	0.512	0.483
Adjusted R ²	0.692	0.191	0.879	0.493	0.464
F Statistic (df = 11; 577)	124.453***	14.829***	398.411***	54.943***	49.078***


Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ideology scores also provide interesting findings when they interact with dummy variables. Both Table 2 and 3 show illustrate positive and significant relationship between *DWHouse* x *Coast* and trade, which suggests having a coastline mitigates the

negative relationship between conservative ideology and trade. Similar positive and significant relationships can also be found between $DWHouse \times Party$ and trade, implying that if a state legislature is dominated by Republicans, the negative relationship between conservative ideology and trade is assuaged. Interestingly, the interaction between $DWHouse \times Governor$ and trade also indicates that a Republican governor would ease the negative relationship between conservative ideology and trade.

Following the findings from those interaction terms, more disaggregated analysis is conducted. As demonstrated by Figure 2, in states without coastline, the more conservative House representatives are, the less trade the states will engage in with China, which is consistent with the main hypothesis. However, it is surprising to see that in states with a coastline, the more conservative House representatives are, the more trade the states will engage in with China. The reason behind that phenomenon could lie in partisan competition. Because most coastal states are liberal-leaning, conservative representatives need to demonstrate a certain level of liberal traits to attract voters, and being more open to China economically could be used a strategy to offset their conservative marks on cultural and social issues.

Figure 2. Ideology and trade with China, controlling for coast



When controlling for governor's party affiliation (see Figure 3), it can be seen that if a governor's a Democrat or an independent, the negative relationship between conservative ideology and trade with China still holds. However, in a state where the governor is a Republican, that relationship turns positive. One plausible explanation for the positive relationship is that geographically-based: many states with Republican governors are non-coastal states whose economic performance is relatively worse than that of their coastal counterparts. Even though many Republican governors are ideologically conservative in cultural and social issues and can also appeal to voters with their conservative stances, they still need to put a premium on the economy of their states. Conservative legislators are also aware that in order to maintain their advantage in gubernatorial elections, it is thus necessary to keep trading with China as economic foundation.

Figure 3. Ideology and trade with China, controlling for governor's party affiliation





Figure 4 controls for the composition of state legislatures. As it shows, if the state legislature is dominated by Democrats, the negative relationship between conservative ideology and trade with China still holds. However, in a state where the GOP is dominant, that relationship becomes positive. The explanation for this phenomenon could be because Republican-dominated states have less electoral concern since they usually maintain their edge over winning congressional seats and the ideological environment in those states are moving further to the right. In the meantime, their trade with China has already demonstrated a rising trend considering their growing economy. In this case, the positive relationship between ideology and state-level trade with China could be a result of spurious relationship.

Figure 4. Ideology and trade with China, controlling for the composition of state legislatures



Conclusion

This article uses a panel dataset consisting of all American states between 2009 and 2020 to study the correlation between ideology and state-level trade with China. The

more conservative a state's House representatives become, the less trade it will engage in with China; conversely, the more liberal the representatives, the more trade the state will engage in with China. In addition, this article finds that when controlling for different factors, the relationship between conservative ideology of House representatives and trade with China could turn positive in the following situations: states with a coastline, states with a Republican governor, and states that are dominated by Republicans.

This article offers a way to study what kind of a trading pattern could be found when factoring in congressional ideology. Although this article does not claim that ideology has a direct causal impact on state-level trade with China, it does provide a perspective to study international trade through an ideological lens, which paves the foundation for further research to study the role of ideology and polarization in foreign policy making.

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